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supply framework, we analyze the eﬀects of the adoption of an in￿ation targeting regime on
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conducted using optimized interest rate policy rules within a calibrated model. Rules for
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In￿ation targeting has become part of the new orthodoxy on monetary policy. The ingredients
are delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank, use of short-term interest rates
as the instrument of policy, in￿ation targeting, and ￿oating exchange rates. Individual countries
set interest rates independently to meet their own in￿ation targets; there is no coordination of
policies among countries. This appears to have become a successful recipe for macroeconomic
management, at least in so far as in￿a t i o nh a sb e e nl o wi nm o s to ft h ed e v e l o p e dw o r l df r o mt h e
mid-1990s, there has been growth in some countries, most obviously the US, and exchange rate
￿uctuations have been the cause of only moderate and intermittent concerns. International
coordination of economic policy is conspicuously almost completely absent from the agenda,
both among policy makers, and in the scholarly world.1
There is an interesting contrast to be drawn between this new millenial orthodoxy and
the one that prevailed around twenty years ago. Then ￿oating exchange rates ruled, but the
nominal anchor was to be provided by control of the money supply. Whether because the
economic conditions of the times were more agitated, or whether because control of monetary
aggregates was a less good model for policy, exchange rates were highly volatile in the early
1980s. The swings in the value of the major currencies were the cause of great concern,
provoked policy intervention, and stimulated much scholarly analysis. The then young CEPR
made international economic policy coordination one of the themes of its research programme
in international macroeconomics2.
The arguments in favour of policy coordination made at that time were based on there being
spillovers of the eﬀects of policy between countries under ￿oating exchange rates. Countries
responding independently to a common adverse supply shock would be inclined to rely on the
exchange rate appreciation induced by a tightening of monetary policy. The overall result
was likely to be too much monetary tightening. In other circumstances, in response to other
shocks, independent, uncoordinated policy actions might be too weak. Coordinated actions by
1Coordinated policy actions are sporadic. There was concerted intervention to support the Euro in autumn
2000. There has been concern about the eﬀects of the value of the Yen on Japanese recovery prospects, but no
real action.
2Some of the results of the research were published in Buiter and Marston (1994). Later Canzoneri and
Henderson (1991) produced a synthesis and overview of the subject.
2all countries are able in principle to achieve better results for all.
It remains true under a policy that uses setting of short-term interest rates to achieve an
in￿ation target in an environment of ￿oating exchange rates that the spillover eﬀects remain.
One of the principle channels of policy transmission in open economies is the exchange rate
eﬀect on the consumer price index of an interest rate change. Nevertheless there has been
relatively little discussion of international coordination of policy to date. This may be because
exchange rate volatility is more generally accepted now than it was twenty years ago. In fact
exchange rates are currently much less volatile than they were then. It may be because the
earlier literature concluded that the gains to be had from coordination were modest.
There has been extensive analysis of in￿ation targeting in open economies, for example Ball
(1999), Svensson (2000) and Sutherland (2000). Indeed, most of the in￿ation targetters are
small open economies. But there has been little on coordination. The idea of introducing policy
responses to asset price bubbles has been mooted by Checchetti et al (2000), largely in response
to movements in stock prices and real estate, the US stock market, Japan, South East Asia, and
so on, with passing observations on exchange rates.
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to explore possible eﬀects of coor-
dination of policy among countries that target in￿ation using interest rates as instruments of
policy. While the principal explicit in￿ation-targetters are small open economies ￿ New Zealand,
Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Australia, Spain ￿ we have modeled a world of just two
identical economies.
Our analysis is developed using an aggregate demand-aggregate supply framework that com-
bines features of the widely used New Keynesian model of output and in￿ation with open-
economy eﬀects. In our analysis we will take the view of Batini and Haldane (1999) and McCal-
lum and Nelson (1999b), among others, who describe as an in￿ation targeting strategy the use
of a simple monetary policy rule that sets the policy instrument as a function of the deviations
of the in￿ation forecast, for a de￿ned horizon, from the target. In our analysis that implies that
the monetary authorities use an in￿ation forecast monetary policy rule ￿ the policy instrument
reacts to deviations of expected in￿ation from target ￿ to minimize an expected loss.
Using simulation analysis, the questions we try to answer, in the context of our linear ra-
tional expectations model, are these. What happens to exchange rate volatility when either or
both countries change from a regime where policymakers react directly to deviations of in￿ation
and output from target to an in￿ation forecast rule? Does adding a response to the exchange
rate directly or to a portfolio shock reduce exchange rate volatility and improve economic per-
formance? Does the establishment of some sort of co-ordination between countries result in a
3better outcome for the exchange rate stability and welfare?
Before developing a model, however, we turn to data on in￿ation and exchange rates for a
number of in￿ation targetters, to review brie￿y the various experiences of these countries, and
to provide a little more empirical context for the analysis of policies.
2 A Brief Review of Recent Experience
In order to review brie￿y the experiences that countries have had under in￿ation targeting
and alternative frameworks for monetary policy, Figures 1 to 4 show the paths of the in￿ation
rate and the trade-weighted exchange rate for eight countries: Australia, Canada, Finland,
Germany, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The data run from 1985 to
2000, and cover periods in which these countries have employed a variety of diﬀerent frameworks
for monetary policy, and have taken part in a variety of exchange rate regimes. The ￿gures
show, in addition to the economic data, a line labelled ￿￿lter probabilities ￿ regime 1￿. This
refers to an estimated division of the data into two ￿regimes￿ based on the mean and variance
of each series. The procedure for estimating the regimes is set out in detail in the appendix.
It allows for a data-determined division of the data into (for example) high variance and low
variance periods.
New Zealand was one of the ￿rst countries to adopt in￿ation targeting, following the Reserve
Bank Act of 1989. Figure 2 shows that for New Zealand￿s in￿ation there was a fairly clear
change of regime in 19 9 0 . I nf a c tt h em e a na n dt h ev a r i a n c eo fi n ￿a t i o nf e l la tt h a tt i m e . T h e
adoption of in￿ation targeting has (at least super￿cially) been successful in this respect. Figure
4 shows that there was concurrently a change in regime for New Zealand￿s exchange rate. Its
volatility fell signi￿cantly. New Zealand￿s experience may suggest that in￿ation targeting might
be capable of achieving both greater price stability and greater exchange rate stability.
The experience of Sweden has been very diﬀerent. Sweden adopted in￿ation targeting
after the succession of speculative attacks on the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European
Monetary System in 1992, after which its exchange rate been ￿oating, so it is unsurprising that
the volatility of Sweden￿s exchange rate rose at the end of 1992. The visual impression of the
data is con￿rmed by the estimated pattern of regimes, with a clear shift to a high volatility
regime at the end of 1992. Nevertheless, the mean and variance of Sweden￿s in￿ation have
fallen, though more slowly, since the introduction of in￿ation targeting.
Canada exhibits a yet diﬀerent pattern. While Canadian in￿ation fell in 1991, a visual
impression con￿rmed by the estimated division of the data in Figure 1 into two regimes, with
4as w i t c hi n1991, the volatility of the exchange rate has been more or less unchanged. The
adoption of in￿ation targets in Canada in 1991 has been associated with lower and more stable
in￿ation.
Space does not permit a full discussion of the eight cases illustrated in the ￿gures. This very
brief sketch is intended to serve as a reminder that the experiences of the small open economies
that have adopted in￿ation targeting have been very varied and aﬀected by numerous conditions
speci￿c to each country. The data suggest that the adoption of in￿ation targeting has not
been associated with systematically more or less variable exchange rates than the regime that
preceded it. This may explain the relative lack of concern in policy circles about exchange rate
coordination. Most countries in the mid 1990s achieved lower and less variable in￿ation. The
data do not throw any light on the issue of whether coordinated responses to exchange rate
movements could allow countries to achieve better outcomes in terms of exchange rate, output,
and employment volatility, without prejudicing in￿ation performance. Of course this review
of the data does not enable causal connections to be inferred. We turn now to a simulation
analysis of whether coordinated policy might be able to oﬀer better outcomes.
3 Description of the Model
The analysis is conducted in an aggregate demand and aggregate supply framework that contains
elements of the widely used New Keynesian model of output and in￿ation, combined with open-
economy eﬀects. This framework has emerged, in the last decade, as broadly consensual and
highly useful in the analysis of monetary policy rules (see, for example, Rudebusch: 2000; Taylor:
1999). As argued by Ball (1999), one advantage of this framework is its simplicity and realism
in the description of the monetary transmission mechanism.
The model has the following structure:
yt = α1Etyt+1 − α2rt + α3qt−1 + α4y∗




t − α3qt−1 + α4yt−1 + α5y∗
t−1 + v∗
t + zt (2)





t−1 − β3(qt − qt−1)+†∗
t + ηt (4)
rt = r∗
t + Etqt+1 − qt + ξt (5)





5ξt = ψξt−1 + θt (8)
All the variables in the model are log deviations around the steady state, with the exception
of nominal interest rates that are in levels. Variables with an asterisk (*) refer to the foreign
economy.
Equations (1) and (2) are dynamic IS curves, of the kind derived by McCallum and Nelson
(1999a), with open-economy elements. These authors show that the IS curves can be derived as
the linear reduced-form of a fully optimising general equilibrium model. They include a leading
term for output that captures the eﬀects of expected income on today￿s spending. This feature
of the IS speci￿cation is particularly important in our model, where today￿s shocks to the foreign
economy can be passed through expectations of today￿s home income. The inclusion of lagged
output on the right-hand side of the IS equations, although its theoretical derivation is less
clear-cut, is widely agreed to account for adjustment costs that result in some output inertia
observable in the data. However, at this stage we set α5 =0 .
Output also depends negatively on the interest rate, and positively on a currency deprecia-
tion, in the usual way. The exchange rate is de￿ned as the price of foreign currency in terms
of domestic money, such that an increase in q represents a real depreciation of the domestic
currency. The inclusion of the foreign country income in the IS curve of each country re￿ects
the ￿locomotive￿ eﬀect of one country on the other. Finally, white noise shocks to the IS curve
are considered, ν (ν∗) the country-speci￿c demand shock and z the common shock.
Equations (3) and (4), representing the supply side of the economy, are open-economy Phillips
curves. The inclusion of expected and lagged in￿ation on the right-hand side of the in￿ation
equation, in the New Keynesian form, is strongly supported by several authors (Svensson: 1999;
Ball: 1999; McCallum: 1997). The dependence of in￿ation on its own lagged value, re￿ects
in￿ation persistence, which may result from elements of backward-lookingness in the wage-
setting process (see Batini and Haldane:1999; Fuhrer and Moore: 1995). However, there is
no agreement on the degree of in￿ation persistence (see section on calibration). In￿ation also
depends on the output gap with a lag. Additionally, the in￿ation equations include an open-
economy term as in Ball (1999). In￿ation depends on the lagged change in the exchange rate
because changes in exchange rates are passed directly to in￿ation via the price of imported
goods.3 Finally, ε (ε∗) represents the country-speci￿c supply shock and η the common shock.
These shocks are assumed to be white noise.
3Ball (1999) shows that aggregate in￿ation can be represented as a weighted average of domestic and imported
in￿ation, with weights given by the share of imports and domestic goods in the price index. The in￿ation rate
depends on changes in the exchange rate, which directly in￿uences import prices that enter the de￿nition of the
6Equation (5), the uncovered interest parity (UIP), is expressed in terms of real exchange
rates. This condition includes a term, ξ, that can be interpreted as a portfolio shock, assumed
to follow an auto-regressive process of order one, as in equation (8).
Equations (6) and (7) represent the Fisher identity linking the real interest rate, the nominal
interest rate and the expected in￿ation rate. It is required because central banks can only control
nominal interest rates, i, but consumption and investment decisions, and therefore aggregate
demand, are based on the ex ante real interest rate.
The policy of the monetary authorities is modelled by interest rate rules (see section on
optimised policy rules). Thus the LM curve is redundant; the demand for money is always
accommodated at unchanged interest rates.
4 The monetary transmission mechanism in the model
Because the model￿s lag structure is fundamental to the analysis to be performed below, the
operation of the monetary transmission mechanism is worthy of some words of explanation. An
open economy diﬀers from the closed economy case because of the existence of an additional
channel: the exchange rate. In a closed economy the real interest rate is the only channel from
monetary policy to the real economy and prices. This channel is captured in our simple model
in the following way. An increase in the domestic interest rate, for instance, changes the real
interest rate, raising the cost of capital, and thereby causing a move in aggregate demand ￿
equation (1). This change in aggregate demand is then transmitted to in￿ation through the
output gap term - equation (3). In this model there is the additional channel of exchange
rates, which can work in two diﬀerent ways: ￿rst, indirectly through its eﬀect on exports and
consequent impact on the output gap. Second, there is a direct eﬀect of exchange rates changes
on in￿ation through their eﬀect on the cost of imported products. The exchange rate also has
an important role in the transmission of shocks between countries.
Given the described lag structure, monetary policy aﬀects the country￿s current output and
it aﬀects in￿ation with one lag, through the traditional real interest rate channel, in accordance
with the empirical evidence that monetary policy aﬀects output more rapidly than in￿ation.
Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the following way,
π = Γπ
d +( 1 − Γ)π
m
That is, aggregate in￿ation is an average of the domestic, π
d,a n di m p o r t ,π
m,i n ￿ation and where (1 − Γ) is the
weight of import goods in the price index.
7And, via the exchange rate channel, it aﬀects current in￿ation directly and indirectly, through
its eﬀect on exports demand, with two lags.
5C a l i b r a t i o n o f t h e m o d e l
The parameter values draw upon the work of several authors mentioned below. There is a lack
of consensus in the literature concerning the values that the parameters should take.
One of the most uncertain parameters in this model is the in￿ation persistence coeﬃcient,
β1. As mentioned above, although the value of this parameter is not theoretically clearly
determined, the existence of adjustment costs and overlapping price and wage contracts make it
realistic to assume some in￿ation persistence. Rudebusch (2000) refers to several studies (Fair:
1993; Fuhrer: 1997; Chadha et al: 1992; Brayton et al: 1997), and concludes that a plausible
range for β1 would be [0.4,1]. In view of the range of plausible values for β1 we perform
sensitivity analysis below.
Although there is some empirical evidence supporting the inclusion of lagged output in the
IS equation, the uncertainty surrounding an appropriate value and the fact that there is no
agreement on its theoretical derivation, leads us to set α1 =1and α5 =0 ,a ss u g g e s t e db y
McCallum and Nelson (1999a).
Another highly uncertain parameter is the real interest rate coeﬃcient, α2.B a t i n i a n d
Nelson (2000) note that its value varies widely in studies of policy rules: for quarterly data,
it ranges from 0.2 in Estrella and Fuhrer (1998) and McCallum and Nelson (1999b), to 6 in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). Although such a wide range invites sensitivity analysis, we
follow Ball (1999) and set α2 =0 .6.
The open-economy coeﬃcients, α3, α4 and β3, and their foreign economy counterparts,
depend on the economies￿ degree of openness. The coeﬃcient β3 should re￿ect the weight of
imported prices in the CPI. Again, we follow Ball (1999) and we set α3 and β3 equal to 0.2.
The eﬀect of lagged output on the other country￿s demand, given by α4, is related to exports.
W es e ti te q u a lt o0 . 1.
The parameter on the output gap in the in￿ation equation is set equal to 0.4, as in Ball
(1999). The autoregressive parameter in the portfolio shock is assumed to be equal to 0.8.
8Demand Equation Supply Equation
α1 =1 β1 =0 .9
α2 =0 .6 β2 =0 .4
α3 =0 .2 β3 =0 .2
α4 =0 .1
We assume that shocks to output, exchange rates and in￿ation have all a variance of 14.
6 Loss function and simple policy rules
6.1 The welfare function
In the search for policy parameters we assume that policy makers seek to minimize the expected
value of a loss function that is given by a weighted sum of the unconditional variances of output,
in￿ation and the policy instrument:
E[Lt]=Va r[πt]+ω1Va r[yt]+ω2Va r [it − it−1] (9)
T h es a m ew e i g h ti sg i v e nt ot h ev a r i a n c eo fo u t p u ta n di n ￿ation, with ω1 =1 , and only half
of this weight is given to the interest rate volatility term, ω2 =0 .5, following Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999) and Rudebusch (2000). The inclusion of an interest rate smoothing term in
the expected loss reduces volatility of the policy instrument. Weerapana (2000) mentions that,
in the context of an open economy, the non-inclusion of an interest rate volatility term would
generate considerable ￿uctuations in interest rates as the policy makers use them to eliminate
the negative eﬀects of exchange rates. On the other hand, Woodford (1998) provides arguments
for the smoothing of interest rates, based on the idea that high interest rate volatility may
damage the policy makers￿ credibility.
6.2 Classes of optimized policy rules
We consider ￿ve diﬀerent classes of optimized simple interest rate policy rules. The exclusive use
of interest rate rules for policy rests on the evidence that virtually all industrialized countries￿
central banks use some short-term (nominal) interest rate as their policy instrument (Walsh:
1998). Simple rules can have some advantages when compared to optimal rules, as argued
4When calculating the optimal policy parameters we varied those variances, and the results appeared fairly
robust.
9by Batini and Haldane (1999), in the context of forward-looking rules. First, simple rules
can be more robust in the presence of uncertainty about the actual model of the economy, as
is always the case, than optimal rules that are functions of all predetermined state variables
of the model (Taylor, 1999). Second, simple rules, when including forward-looking variables,
can perform almost as well as optimal rules in output and in￿ation stabilization, and still
enhance transparency and make the central bank more accountable resulting, therefore, in higher
credibility. Finally, as emphasized by Ryan and Thompson (2000), and very importantly in the
context of our work, simple rules allow experiences with diﬀerent aspects of the monetary policy
operating framework. However, because they do not use all the information available they will
not in general be optimal (see Black et al: 1997).
The diﬀerent classes of optimized simple rules we analyze are: an optimized Taylor rule,
an optimized Taylor rule with an exchange rate term, an optimized forward-looking rule, an
optimized forward looking rule with an exchange rate term and an optimized forward looking
rule with a portfolio shock.
6.2.1 Optimized Taylor Rule
The best-known example of a simple rule is the Taylor rule, after Taylor (1993), in which the
interest rate reacts to deviations of output and in￿ation from the target:





The main arguments for Taylor rules rest on their simplicity, with the transparency and
accountability that the central bank gains thereby, and on the fact that they describe actual
monetary policy in several countries since the mid eighties (see, for example, Taylor: 1993).
Hereafter these rules will be referred to as OTH and OTF for the home and foreign economies,
respectively.
6.2.2 Optimized Taylor rule for an open-economy
Ball (1999), extending the Svensson (1997) and Ball (1997) model to an open economy, concludes
that in￿ation targets and Taylor rules are sub-optimal; diﬀerent rules are required because
monetary policy aﬀects the economy through the exchange rate as well as through interest rate
channels. Therefore one might study the case of a policy rule that adds an exchange rate term
10to the Taylor rule. This is equivalent to the use of a ￿Monetary Conditions Index￿5 (an ￿MCI￿)
as an instrument rule, that is, a weighted sum of the interest rate and the exchange rate:




t − ρ3qt (13)
Hereafter these will be referred as OTQH and OTQF, respectively.
6.2.3 Forward-looking policy rule
Countries like New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as other in￿ation targeters,
base their monetary policy explicitly on in￿ation forecasts, using them as an intermediate target
(see Svensson: 1997; Batini and Haldane: 1999). Therefore, the behaviour of in￿ation targeters
might be better described by the following simple forward-looking monetary policy rule:




where i is the policy instrument and γ is the feedback parameter; Etπt+j is the expected value
for in￿ation in period t+j, conditional on the information at time t;a n dj de￿nes the targeting
horizon with its length determined by the lags in monetary policy and the role given to goals
other than in￿ation. In our analysis, and given the lag structure of our model, we assume that
central banks set nominal interest rates in response to deviations of the in￿ation forecast one
period ahead from the target, therefore j =1 . These rules will be referred to as FWH and
FWF, for the home and the foreign economy, respectively, hereafter.
Svensson (1997) suggests that in￿ation forecasts should be seen as an intermediate target
in in￿ation-targeting regimes, in the sense that policy makers react to expected in￿ation in
order to attain the in￿ation target. In that sense, Batini and Haldane (1999) mention its
good performance when it is evaluated on the criteria for a good intermediate target6.F i r s t ,
because in￿ation forecasts use all the information available - including lags in the transmission of
monetary policy - they are by de￿nition the variables most closely correlated with the in￿ation
target and an adequate guide to the state of the economy. Secondly, because in their construction
5A MCI emphasises the fact that monetary policy, in an open economy, has two main channels that aﬀect
aggregate demand - interest and exchange rates - and that when changing interest rates its eﬀects on the exchange
rates must be considered.
6The requirements of any intermediate target are: controllability, predictability and to be a good policy guide.
11they encompass all the lags in the transmission of monetary policy, they are highly controllable
by policy makers.
6.2.4 Forward-looking rule with an exchange rate term
In this speci￿cation the policy makers react not only to deviations of expected in￿ation from
target but also to deviations of the exchange rate from its long run equilibrium:
it = γ1Etπt+1 + γ2qt (16)
i∗
t = δ1Etπ∗
t+1 − δ2qt (17)
The inclusion of an exchange rate term rests on the argument set forth in Cecchetti et al
(2000) that ￿central banks can improve macroeconomic performance by reacting systematically
to asset prices, over and above their reaction to in￿ation forecasts and output gaps.￿ In our
open economy model, because exchange rate ￿uctuations aﬀect aggregate spending, through the
export demand channel, and CPI through import prices, the reaction of the policy instrument
to exchange rate deviations from its equilibrium level can then be justi￿ed on the argument that
i tc o u l dh e l pi no u t p u ta n di n ￿ation stabilization. Hereafter, these rules are referred as FWQH
and FWQF, respectively.
6.2.5 Forward-looking rule with a portfolio shock
Some authors, (see, for example, Smets: 1997; Freedman: 2000; and Cecchetti et al: 2000) argue
that interest rates should oﬀset exchange rate movements only when they result from portfolio
adjustments. In their study on asset prices and monetary policy, Cecchetti et al (2000) claim
that because a portfolio shock to the exchange rate can have long lasting eﬀects on output and
prices and therefore destabilize the economy, central banks should systematically react to it.
Thus, we will consider policy rules where the monetary authorities react to a portfolio shock to
the exchange rate (FWSH and FWSF, respectively, hereafter):
it = ϕ1Etπt+1 + ϕ2ξt (18)
i∗
t = κ1Etπ∗
t+1 − κ2ξt (19)
127S o l v i n g t h e M o d e l
Our multivariate linear rational expectations model is written in the Blanchard-Kahn form
(Blanchard and Kahn: 1980) and then solved using the procedure described in Soderlind (1999),
applying a Schur decomposition to the coeﬃcient matrix7.
The reduced-form solution of the model is of the form
Xt+1 = BXt + Cεt+1 (20)
and the variance-covariance matrix of X, denoted by V, is given by,
vec(V )=[ I − (B ⊗ B)]−1vec(Ω) (21)
where Ω = CV(ε)C08. The variance-covariance matrix of the shocks is the identity matrix in
line with the speci￿cation above.
7.1 Non-cooperative and cooperative behaviour by policy makers
In our analysis, we consider both non-cooperative or cooperative behaviour among policy makers.
In the case of non-cooperative behaviour, parameter values are determined by looking for a
Nash equilibrium in policy rules. We assume that each country knows the other￿s policy rule
and optimizes taking it as given. Thus, for example, the domestic policy maker chooses optimal
policy parameters (via a grid search), taking as given the policy rule of the foreign country.
Knowing (and taking as given) the policy rule of the domestic policy maker, the foreign policy
maker then adjusts his own policy rule in order to minimize his loss function. This process is
iterated until convergence is attained.
In the co-operative case, we use again a grid search procedure to ￿nd the optimal policy
parameters. But now it is assumed that the choice is made jointly with the objective of
minimizing their joint loss function
E[Lt]=Va r(yt)+Va r(y∗
t)+Va r(πt)+Va r (π∗
t)+0 .5Va r(∆it)+0 .5Va r(∆i∗
t) (22)
which is a sum of the individual countries￿ loss functions, re￿ecting the assumption of symmetry.
7We ran all the programs in Gauss and used the implementation of the Schur decomposition made available
by Soderlind at http://www.hhs.se//personal/psoderlind.
8See Hamilton (1994), page 265.
138 Sensitivity Analysis
Given the high degree of uncertainty surrounding some of the model￿s parameters, especially
the in￿ation persistence coeﬃcient, we computed optimal policy rules for diﬀerent values of
the coeﬃcients, and examined the behaviour of the model. Following Rudebusch (2000), who
de￿nes [0.4,1] as a plausible range for β1, we explored the consequences of assuming that β1takes
extreme values of the range, β1 =0 .4 and β1 =0 .9, and also an intermediate value, β1 =0 .6.
To ￿nd the optimal values of the policy parameters we perform grid search over a wide range
of possible values and choose those that minimize the expected loss function. We look for the
optimal parameters λ1, λ2,a n dρ1, ρ2,o ft h eT a y l o rr u l e ;a n d ,γ and δ, of the forward-looking
policy rules, as set out in equations (10), (11)a n d( 14), (15). In equilibrium they will be the
same for both countries.
In the table below we present the resulting optimal policy parameters and the expected losses
for diﬀerent degrees of in￿ation persistence.
Optimised Taylor Rules In￿ation Forecast Rule
In￿ation persistence λ1 = ρ1 λ2 = ρ2 Loss γ = δ Loss
β1 =0 .9 2.2 1.3 9.086 2.0 9.462
β1 =0 .6 1.9 1.3 8.681 2.3 8.769
β1 =0 .4 1.6 1.3 7.439 2.6 7.641
We can conclude that the optimal policy parameters and the expected loss vary considerably
w i t ht h ed e g r e eo fi n ￿ation persistence. For both classes of policy rules welfare increases with
lower in￿ation persistence. The in￿ation reaction parameter in the Taylor rule increases with
in￿ation persistence, re￿ecting the need for tougher policy reactions once in￿ation deviates from
its steady state value. The forward-looking parameter decreases with the degree of in￿ation
persistence.
Given the high sensitivity of our results to the degree of in￿ation persistence, our results
should be interpreted with caution. Despite the controversy as to the most likely ￿gure, we
assume a high level in our analysis, setting β1 =0 .9.
9I n ﬂation targeting and exchange rate volatility
In this section we examine the eﬀects on exchange rate volatility of changing from a regime where
policy makers react directly to deviations of in￿ation and output from the target to an in￿ation
14targeting regime, by one or both countries. We make this assessment for policy rules that react
to domestic output and in￿ation and then for policy rules that also include an exchange rate
term (see section on optimized policy rules).
Although some authors, for example Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), see in￿ation targeting
as a monetary regime in which central bankers pursue an optimization exercise of a welfare
function that penalizes deviations from the in￿ation target, we take the other view. Following
Batini and Nelson (2000) and McCallum and Nelson (1999b), among others, an in￿ation tar-
geting regime is de￿ned as one in which the policy instrument reacts to deviations of expected
in￿ation from target, for a given horizon. The performance of this rule will be compared with
that of a regime where one or both countries follow a Taylor rule, reacting to deviations of out-
put and in￿ation from the target, with and without an exchange rate term. Therefore, in this
section, we analyze the eﬀe c t so nt h ev o l a t i l i t yo ft h ee x c h a n g er a t ew h e nb o t hc o u n t r i e sc h a n g e
from a regime in which they react to output and in￿a t i o nt oa ni n ￿ation targeting regime; and
what happens if one country changes to a strict in￿ation targeting regime and the other keeps
reacting to both in￿ation and output.
9.1 Policy rules without an exchange rate term
We assume here that policy makers do not react to exchange rate movements, in this sense
behaving as if they were in a closed economy. We compare three scenarios. In the ￿rst scenario,
both countries use an optimized Taylor rule (OTH/OTF). The policy rules are set out in
equations (10) and (11) above. In the second scenario, the home country uses a rule based
on an in￿ation forecast, while the foreign country continues to use an optimized Taylor rule
(FWH/OTF). The rules are as set out in equations (14) and (11) above. And in the third
s c e n a r i o ,b o t hc o u n t r i e su s ep o l i c yr u l e sb a s e do ni n ￿ation forecasts (FWH/FWF), as set out
in equations (14) and (15) above. The parameters of the optimal rules are calculated assuming
non-cooperative behaviour, employing the grid search procedure described in section 7 and are
presented below in Table 1.
Table 1. Optimal Parameters in Policy Rules
OTH and OTF FWH and OTF FWH and FWF
Home λ1 =2 .2;λ2 =1 .3 γ =2 γ =2
Foreign ρ1 =2 .2;ρ2 =1 .3 ρ1 =2 .2;ρ2 =1 .3 δ =2
We compute the unconditional variance of the variables of the system in each of the three
scenarios set out above, and we compute also the value of the loss functions for each case. Table
152 below contains the results.
Table 2. Measures of macroeconomic performance under alternative policy rules.
OTH and OTF FWH and OTF FWH and FWF
Var(i) 5.368 5.339 5.420
Var(i*) 5.368 5.388 5.420
Var(y) 3.283 3.894 3.898
Var(y*) 3.283 3.321 3.898
Var(π) 3.506 3.363 3.400
Var(π∗) 3.506 3.544 3.400
Var(q) 4.831 5.584 6.682
L 9.087 9.395 9.463
L* 9.087 9.138 9.463
When the home country alone changes from an optimized Taylor rule to an in￿ation tar-
geting regime we have a higher volatility of output in both countries and a higher exchange
rate volatility. In this case, we do not have signi￿cant changes in the volatility of the policy
instrument (the interest rate), and there is a decrease in the volatility of domestic in￿ation and
an increase in the volatility of foreign in￿ation. The most relevant features of this case are the
higher exchange rate variance and the negative spillover eﬀects to the foreign country, which
maintains the Taylor rule.
Comparing scenario 3, in which both countries change to an in￿ation targeting regime, to
scenario 1, in which both use a Taylor rule, there is a higher volatility of the nominal interest
rate and output and a lower in￿a t i o nv a r i a n c e . Ac h a n g et oa ni n ￿ation targeting regime by
both countries produces higher exchange rate volatility, just as does a unilateral switch by the
home country.
Another outcome of our simulations, in both cases, is that the adoption of an in￿ation
targeting regime worsens the loss function of both countries. In Table 2 we present the values
of the expected loss under diﬀerent combinations of policy rules, with the optimal coeﬃcients
determined non-cooperatively, and use those values to compute pay-oﬀ matrices in Table 3
below.
Table 3. Payoﬀ Matrix for a Game in policy rules
without Exchange Rate Response
16Foreign→ Taylor rule Forward rule
Home↓ Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Taylor rule 9.087 9.087 9.138 9.395
Forward rule 9.395 9.138 9.463 9.463
In this case, where both countries do not react directly to the exchange rate, we can conclude
that a strategy where both countries follow a Taylor rule is a Nash equilibrium.
9.2 Policy rules with an exchange rate term
Until now our analysis has ignored any possible reactions of policy makers to exchange rate
movements. However, as mentioned above, in an open economy monetary policy has the extra
channel of the exchange rate and, therefore, it maybe that including an exchange rate term
improves macroeconomic performance. Thus we examine the properties of the system when
policy makers react to the exchange rate. Their concern with exchange rate movements results
exclusively from their individual welfare maximization. At this point we do not introduce
coordinated responses to exchange rate movements. Again three scenarios are considered, as
follows.
When both countries use optimized Taylor rules with an exchange rate term (OTQH/OTQF)
t h er u l e sa r ea si ne q u a t i o n s( 12) and (13) above. When only the home country uses an in￿ation
forecast rule with an exchange rate term while the foreign country uses an optimized Taylor rule
with an exchange rate term (FWQH/OTQF) the rules are given by equations (16) and (13).
A n dw h e nb o t hc o u n t r i e su s ei n ￿ation forecast rules with exchange rate terms (FWQH/FWQF),
t h er u l e sa r e( 16) and (17).
Again, the optimal policy parameters are computed for the diﬀerent cases and regimes as-
suming that policy makers behave non-cooperatively. The rules are presented below in table
4.
Table 4. Parameter values of optimal policy rules, rules including response to exchange rate
OTQH vs. OTQF FWQH vs. OTQF FWQH vs. FWQF
Home λ1 =2 ;λ2 =1 .1;λ3 =0 .2 γ1 =1 .8;γ2 =0 .2 γ1 =1 .83;γ2 =0 .16
Foreign ρ1 =2 ;ρ2 =1 .1;ρ3 =0 .2 ρ1 =2 .1;ρ2 =1 .8;ρ3 =0 .2 δ1 =1 .83;δ2 =0 .16
The resulting unconditional variance of the variables of the systems are set out below in table
175.
Table 5. Performance Measures under alternative policy combinations
with rules that respond to the exchange rate (q).
OTQH and OTQF FWQH and OTQF FWQH and FWQF
Var(i) 5.005 5.198 5.800
Var(i*) 5.005 4.980 5.800
Var(y) 3.300 3.602 3.680
Var(y*) 3.300 2.450 3.680
Var(π) 3.605 3.489 3.650
Var(π∗) 3.605 4.645 3.650
Var(q) 3.967 4.297 8.663
L 9.009 9.4159 . 4 4 7
L* 9.009 9.122 9.447
A change by the home country to in￿ation targeting with an exchange rate term, while the
other country continues to use an optimized Taylor rule (with an exchange rate term), results
in lower volatility of its in￿ation and in higher volatility of the policy instrument (the interest
rate), output and the exchange rate. The foreign country has lower volatility of output and
interest rate, and higher volatility of in￿ation. In this case both countries are worse oﬀ.
A change by both countries to an in￿ation targeting regime with an exchange rate term,
with policy rules chosen non-cooperatively, results in higher volatility of the whole system and
therefore in a higher loss. In the next section, we explore in more detail the potential bene￿ts
of reacting to exchange rate movements in an in￿ation targeting regime and the scope for co-
operation.
Using the values of the losses for the diﬀerent cases and regimes we can, as in the previous
section, compute the payoﬀ m a t r i x ,a n dt h i si ss e to u ti nt a b l e6 .
Table 6. Payoﬀ Matrix for a Game in Policy Rules
with Exchange Rate Response.
Foreign→ Taylor rule Forward rule
Home↓ Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Taylor rule 9.009 9.009 9.122 9.415
Forward rule 9.4159 . 122 9.447 9.447
18As before, we conclude that a strategy in which both countries follow a Taylor rule with an
exchange rate term is a Nash equilibrium.
From the analysis in this section we can conclude that a change to an in￿ation targeting
regime, both for the case in which policy makers do not react to the exchange rate, and for the
case in which they do, results in higher volatility of the exchange rate and in a higher loss for
both countries. We also conclude that a strategy where both countries follow a Taylor rule is
a Nash equilibrium. Another interesting result is that the adoption of an in￿ation targeting
regime by one country has negative spillover eﬀects on the welfare of the other country, which
maintains a Taylor rule.
I nt h en e x ts e c t i o n ,w ea n a l y z ei nm o r ed e t a i lt h eb e n e ￿ts of reacting to the exchange rate
in the context of an in￿ation targeting regime.
10 Portfolio shocks and inﬂation targeting
In the previous section we examined the eﬀects of a policy response to exchange rate ￿uctuations,
both in the case of optimized Taylor rules and in the case of in￿ation forecast targeting. In this
section we turn our attention to the relative merits of a policy response to the exchange rate
per se and a policy response only to the portfolio shocks that aﬀect the exchange rate. This
follows the suggestion of several authors (for example, Cecchetti et al: 2000; Freedman: 2000)
that the policy instrument should only react to exchange rate movements that do not re￿ect
fundamentals. In this section of the paper, we focus on in￿ation forecast rules rather than
optimized Taylor rules9.
10.1 Responding to the exchange rate itself
We ￿rst examine the eﬀects of reacting directly to exchange rate, in the context of an in￿ation
targeting regime. When policy makers follow the in￿ation forecast rules FWH and FWF
respectively, the optimal policy parameters are γ = δ =2 . When they introduce a response to
the exchange rate the policy rules become FWQH and FWQF as set out in equations (16) and
(17) above, and the optimal parameters become γ1 = δ1 =1 .83; γ2 = δ2 =0 .16.
This response to exchange rate movements results in higher volatility of the exchange rate and
a slight improvement in welfare, relative to the situation in which they react only to deviations
of the expected in￿ation from the target (see table 7 below).
9In this case we ignore all the diﬃculties associated with the assessment of the kind of shock aﬀecting the
exchange rate.
19Table 7. Performance Measures for In￿ation Forecast Policy Rules
Non-Cooperative Policies Cooperative Policies
FW FWQ FWS FWQ FWS
Var(i)=Var(i∗) 5.420 5.800 4.815 5.584 4.612
Var(y)=Var(y∗) 3.898 3.680 3.646 3.729 3.507
Var(π)=Var(π*) 3.400 3.650 3.473 3.632 3.713
Var(q) 6.682 8.663 5.070 7.566 4.457
L=L* 9.463 9.447 9.060 9.425 9.007
Note. FW denotes in￿ation forecast targeting with no response to exchange rate; FWQ
in￿ation forcast targeting with response to exchange rate; FWS in￿ation forecast targeting
with response to portfolio shocks. Both countries are using the same rule.
The reduction in the welfare loss results from a decrease in output volatility. On the other hand,
t h ev a r i a n c eo fi n ￿ation and of the policy instrument (the nominal interest rate) increases.
Therefore, we conclude that, in the context of an in￿ation targeting regime, the bene￿ts of
reacting non-cooperatively to the exchange rate, are not very great. Later we explore the scope
for bene￿cial cooperation.
10.2 Responding to portfolio shocks
As mentioned above, there is a widespread view in the literature that the bene￿ts of reacting or
not reacting to a movement of the exchange rate depends crucially on the cause of its movement.
Smets (1997), for example, suggests that the reason why the Bank of Canada used a MCI during
the 90s was because the shocks hitting the exchange rate during that period were due to portfolio
adjustments, and that under such circumstances it was bene￿cial to allow the induced changes
in the exchange rate to modify the choice of interest rates. In order to explore this idea in this
paper, we compare the variance of the system when policy makers react to a portfolio shock and
with the variance of the system when they do not.
The policy rules that include responses to portfolio shocks are FWSH and FWSF set out in
equations (18) and (19) above. The optimal coeﬃcients are ϕ1 = κ1 =1 .72 and ϕ2 = κ2 =0 .27,
respectively. We note that when they react to the portfolio shock rather than to the exchange
rate, policy makers￿ responses to expected future in￿ation is less aggressive (the coeﬃcient is
201.72 rather than 1.83), and they react more aggressively to a portfolio shock (coeﬃcient 0.27)
than to a movement of the exchange rate itself (coeﬃcient 0.16).
The performance of the economy under these rules is set out in table 7. Reacting to the
portfolio shock (column: Non-cooperative Policies, FWS) results in a better macroeconomic
performance than does reacting to the exchange rate itself (column: Non-cooperative Policies,
FWQ). The interest rate, output, in￿ation, and the exchange rate all become less volatile.
There is an improvement in welfare. The value of the loss function falls from 9.447 to 9.060.
However, as compared with the in￿ation forecast rule (column: Non-cooperative Polices,
FW), responding to portfolio shocks has not helped in stabilizing in￿ation. This result may
appear to contradict the idea of some authors (see, for example, Mundell: 2000, cited in Cecchetti
et al: 2000) that responding to a portfolio shock can help in in￿ation stabilization. However our
result is likely to be a consequence of our assumed objective function, which puts equal weight
on output stabilization and in￿ation stabilization, and also weights stabilizing the interest rate.
The thing to note is that the increase in in￿ation variance (3.473 as against 3.400) is modest,
compared with the reductions in the variances of output, interest rates, and the exchange rates.
It is likely that another choice of policy parameters would maintain the in￿ation variance at
the initial level and continue to bring substantial gains in the variances of the other variables.
In particular it is striking that the reduction in loss that results from responding to portfolio
shocks greatly exceeds that obtained by responding to the exchange rate itself.
Another striking result is that responding to portfolio shocks greatly reduces the variance
of the exchange rate, as compared with the eﬀects of no response, either to the shock or to the
exchange rate, and of a response to the exchange rate. This may reinforce the attractiveness of
this kind of policy rule, particularly if there are bene￿ts to exchange rate stability that are not
captured in the loss function used in this paper.
11 Inﬂation targeting and cooperation
The analysis so far has assumed the countries act independently of each other in choosing rules
for their interest rates. That is, they are acting non-cooperatively. In this section we turn
our attention to the scope for cooperative policy making to achieve better results. We stick
with the situation of both countries using in￿ation forecast targets. Cooperative behaviour is
modelled by having the policy makers in the two countries choose jointly the policy parameters
that minimize their joint loss function. We ￿rst analyze the scope for cooperation when policy
makers react explicitly neither to the exchange rate nor to the portfolio shock, and then we
21consider policy rules that include these reactions.
11.1 Cooperative rules that respond only to domestic variables
In the setting analyzed in section 9.1, in which policy rules react only to domestic variables,
co-operative behaviour by policy makers results in very similar optimal coeﬃcients to the non-
cooperative case. In the in￿ation targeting case, the case of most interest here, when the policy
instrument reacts to deviations of expected in￿ation from the target, we ￿nd that the optimal
policy parameter is equal to 2, both in the cooperative and non-cooperative cases. Despite the
fact that, in the case of the forward-looking rule, the policy instrument is reacts implicitly to
the exchange rate, there are no gains from cooperation.
11.2 Cooperative rules that respond to the exchange rate
When policy makers in the two countries cooperate on in￿ation forecast targeting, including an
explicit response to the exchange rate, the policy rules have the form FWQH and FWQF set
out in equations (16) and (17) above, and the optimal parameter values are γ1 = δ1 =1 .85 and
γ2 = δ1 =0 .09 for expected in￿ation and the exchange rate, respectively.
From the outcome presented in table 7 above, we can conclude that co-operation (relative
to non-cooperation) results in lower volatility of the exchange rate, of in￿ation and of the policy
instrument. Output, however becomes more volatile. Globally this results in a very slight
reduction in the welfare loss. In this case, we can conclude that, even if price stability were the
only objective of policy makers, setting interest rates cooperatively and reacting to the exchange
rate would be a better strategy than non-cooperation.
11.3 Co-operative rules that respond to a portfolio shock
Should the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States cooperate
in the presence of, let us say, an irrational love by dollars? That is the kind of question we
try to answer in this section. That is, we analyze whether there are any gains from reacting
cooperatively to a portfolio shock rather than non-cooperatively.
The policy rules once again take the form set out in equations (18) and (19). The optimal
policy parameters when both countries react co-operatively to a portfolio shock are, ϕ1 = κ1 =
1.56 and ϕ2 = κ2 =0 .35 for expected in￿ation and the portfolio shock, respectively. Note that
when policy makers respond cooperatively to the portfolio shock rather than to the exchange
rate itself, their response to the in￿ation forecast is less aggressive (coeﬃcient 1.56 rather than
221.85), and the response to the portfolio shock is aggressive (coeﬃcient 0.35) relative to the
response to the exchange rate (coeﬃcient 0.09). The performance measures for the case where
both countries react to the portfolio shock co-operatively are set out in table 7 above.
We conclude that reacting cooperatively to a portfolio shock produces a better result than
reacting non-cooperatively: the policy instrument, output and the exchange rate become less
volatile. However, we should stress that although there is a reduction in the welfare loss, the
in￿ation rate in this case becomes more volatile.
12 Conclusion
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v es i m u l a t e dt h ee ﬀects of various policy rules in a world consisting of two
open economies with ￿oating exchange rates. The questions we wish to address concern: (1)t h e
eﬀects of in￿ation targeting on exchange rate volatility; (2) the possibilities for reducing exchange
rate volatility and improving economic performance by countries￿ modifying their policy rules
to include responses either to movements in exchange rates or to the portfolio shocks that aﬀect
exchange rates; (3) the bene￿ts of countries￿ coordinating their interest rate policies.
Modelling the introduction of in￿ation targeting as a shift from the use of an optimized
Taylor rule to the use of an in￿ation forecast rule for interest rates, we ￿nd that exchange rate
volatility rises substantially (by roughly one third) and economic performance generally worsens.
In￿ation becomes less variable, at the price of greater variability of output and interest rates.
In the context of countries using optimized Taylor rules for policy, introducing a response of
interest rates to exchange rate movements brings about a small improvement in overall perfor-
mance, made up of lower volatility of interest rates oﬀset partly by higher volatility of output
and in￿ation. The volatility of the exchange rate is signi￿cantly reduced. Of all the scenarios
we simulated, this one, with countries using optimized Taylor rules augmented by a response
to exchange rate movements, despite the absence of coordination of policy between countries,
yields almost the best overall performance.
In the context of countries using in￿ation forecast rules, the introduction of a response of
interest rates to the exchange rate brings only modest improvements in performance, whether
policy is coordinated or not. Interestingly it does not bring about a reduction in exchange
rate volatility. Greater bene￿ts are produced by introducing a response to the portfolio shock.
This has the eﬀect of stabilizing exchange rates and interest rates. While the best overall
performance (among our simulations) was produced by internationally coordinated in￿ation
forecast rules augmented by responses to portfolio shocks, this only marginally exceeded the
23performance of non-coordinated optimized Taylor rules also augmented by a response to the
exchange rate.
The simulations suggest that modifying policy rules to include a response to portfolio shocks
can bring about signi￿cant reductions in the volatility of interest rates and exchange rates,
and an improvement in overall performance. In our simulations, the improvements in overall
performance typically consist of lower variances of output and interest rates, partly oﬀset by
slightly higher in￿ation variance. Thus we have not shown that an improvement in every
dimension of performance can be achieved. But it seems likely that a diﬀerent selection of
policy rules would be able to achieve this. Our policy rules have been chosen with reference to
an objective function that weights output variance in￿ation variance equally, and gives weight
t ot h ev a r i a n c eo fi n t e r e s tr a t ec h a n g e s .
The simulations suggest that modest further gains can be obtained by international coordi-
nation of interest rate rules, when these contain some response either to exchange rates per se
or to the portfolio shocks that aﬀect them.
In the present paper the analysis has necessarily been limited in its scope, and suggests many
questions for further exploration. The model has imposed numerous assumptions. We have
tried to choose widely acceptable ones, but inevitably some are more contentious, and the results
may be sensitive to some of these. Our sensitivity analysis reveals the sensitivity of the results
to the assumed degree of in￿ation persistence. The question of the lag structure is particularly
sensitive and worthy of further inquiry, as is the related issue of the transmission mechanism of
interest rates.
We have restricted the paper to consideration of a small number of simple policy rules.
While these have the virtue of simplicity and descriptive realism, they raise the problem of
operating in a second best world. There are many possible alternative simple rules that might
be compared. It would be interesting to explore the benchmark provided by the optimal state- or
shock-contingent policy rules. Our results are based on a particular choice of objective function,
and while this attempts to reproduce a consensus view of policy objectives, it would be useful
to explore alternatives.
Notwithstanding these cautionary notes, we argue that the paper shows that augmenting
interest rate policy rules by responses to the portfolio shocks that aﬀect exchange rates may
have bene￿cial eﬀects. This reinforces the case for oﬀsetting ￿irrational love of dollars￿ and
other non-fundamental movements in exchange rates. It appears that this introduces a degree
of surrogate international coordination, because, while there are additional gains for explicit
international policy coordination, these are relatively small.
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13 Appendix
This section sets out in detail the method used to derive the estimates of the diﬀerent regimes
into which the data for in￿ation and exchange rates reported in Figreus 1 t o4m a yb ed i v i d e d .
We apply the methodology of Markov-switching models to describe the in￿ation and exchange
rate processes for several countries since the mid 1980￿s. The motivation for using this approach
comes from the work of Engel and Hamilton (1990), Engel and Hakkio (1997) and Evans and
Wachtel (1993). Thus we consider the model
xt =[ α0(1 − st)+α1st]+[ σ0(1 − st)+σ1st]ut, (A1)
where {st} is a homogeneous Markov chain of order 1 with state space S = {0,1} and transition
probabilities p =P r [ st =1 |st−1 =1 ]and q =P r [ st =0 |st−1 =0 ] ; {ut} is a white noise with zero
mean and unit variance, independent of {st}.
The speci￿cation of the mechanism governing transitions between the two regimes as a
Markov process has the obvious advantage of requiring no a priori information about the location
of the shifts in regime, letting the data select when and where these shifts occur, rather than
imposing them.
Estimation of model (A1)i sc a r r i e do u tb yu s i n gt h ed i s c r e t ev e r s i o no ft h eK a l m a n￿lter algo-
rithm discussed in Hamilton (1994, Ch.22). The inferred probabilities Pr[st =1 |xt,x t−1,...,x1]
of being in the regime represented by st =1at each point in the sample are then calculated.
Regime 1 is attributed when the probability is above 0.5 and the duration is at least 2 periods.
The variables under investigation are the log changes in consumer prices, ∆pt =l n [ pt/pt−1]
and the log changes in foreign exchange rates, EXt =l n [ EXrt/EXrt−1].
We employ quarterly data for the in￿ation and monthly data for the exchange rate over
the period 1985-2000 for eight countries: Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, New Zealand,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.10 For the in￿ation rate, mean and variance both depend
10Data were obtained from Datastream.
28on which regime is operative while for the exchange rate, only the variance is allowed to vary
according to a hidden Markov chain.
Before estimating the model we directly test a single-regime model against a Markov-
switching alternative. Although the two models are nested, the usual likelihood ratio statis-
tic does not have a chi-squared asymptotic distribution since, under the null hypothesis of a
single regime, the transition probabilities are unidenti￿ed and the information matrix is sin-
gular. To overcome these diﬃculties, we carry out the test using the standardised likelihood
ratio test procedure developed by Hansen (1992, 1996). This procedure requires evaluation of
the likelihood function across a grid of diﬀerent values for the transition probabilities and for
each state-dependent parameter. For in￿ation, from Table A1, the value of the standardised
likelihood ratio statistics and related P-values under the null hypothesis (see Hansen (1996),
for details) show strong evidence in favour of Markov regime switching for all the countries.
Using exchange rates data, from Table A2, we ￿nd strong evidence in favour of Markov regime-
switching for Finland, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom; for the remaining
countries the null hypothesis of linearity can not be rejected.
Starting with in￿ation, Tables A3 and A5 reports the ML estimates of αi and σi (i =0 ,1),
along with the corresponding standard errors and portmanteau Q statistics for the residuals and
their squares.
The main results suggest that, for all countries, the second half of the eighties and the
early nineties, can be characterised by a high-in￿ation process with relatively high-volatility11.
In contrast, the late nineties can be characterised as a process with a low-mean and smaller
volatility. From Figures 1 and 2, the separation into regimes is very clear-cut, the probabilities
are close to zero or one, and match the impression given by the series. Furthermore, with the
only exception of United Kingdom, a serial correlation test on the standardized and squared
standardized residuals indicates that the model is well-speci￿ed.
For Australia, the series starts with a period characterised by high-in￿ation, switches in
19 9 0t oal o w - i n ￿ation period; stays in that state till 1994 (beginning of in￿ation targeting),
when it switches back to high-in￿ation state in 1995; from 1996 to 2000 it then moves back to
al o w - i n ￿ation regime.
Turning to Canada, it is obvious that there was a single change in regime in 1991 (year of
adoption of in￿ation targets), the system remaining in the regime represented by st =0until
the end of the sample period.
11T h e s er e s u l t sa r ei nl i n ew i t ht h ew o r ko fB a l l( 1992) and Taylor (1981) which show that high in￿ation may
be associated with high variability which re￿ects regime uncertainty.
29The Reserve Bank Act 1989 makes New Zealand the ￿rst country to formally adopt an
in￿ation target. The Act is part of a much wider reform process of New Zealand￿s economy,
initiated in the mid eighties, with the aim of stabilising in￿ation, which had been well above that
of its trading partners (Fischer, 1995) since the 70s. Tables A5 and A6, show that this change
in regime is well captured by the simple model, with the ￿lter indicating a period characterised
by a high-in￿ation/high-variance (pre in￿ation targeting) to a low-in￿ation/low-variance (post
in￿ation targeting) regime.
Finally, Sweden and the United Kingdom adopted in￿ation targeting after the foreign-
exchange crisis of September 1992. Although there is some correspondence, it is interesting
that the division into states does not match up neatly with the adoption of in￿ation targeting
f o re a c hc o u n t r y .
The exchange rate process is allowed to switch between two distributions, one corresponding
to a lower volatile period and the other to a higher volatile sample. The time series {EXt}
satis￿es, therefore, a model which allows for shifts in the variance (i.e. for periods of depreciation
and appreciation), depending on the realized value of the state indicator st.
Results from Tables A7-A8 and Figure 3 con￿rm the ￿ndings obtained from the Hansen
test thus indicating that for Australia, Canada, and Germany a simple Markov switching model
speci￿ed as in (A1) is not able to capture the features of the data.
Table A9 records the results for New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. For all
countries, the estimates look reasonable and signi￿cant with the variances being signi￿cantly
diﬀerent in each regime. In New Zealand and Sweden, the ￿lter probabilities, Figure A4, clearly
show two distinct states associated to a pre and a post in￿ation targeting regime.
Finally, for United Kingdom the series starts by frequently jumping between the two regimes,
before stabilizing to the low-volatility state (1987:06-1992:09). It then move to the high-volatility
state (during the foreign-exchange crisis) and it switches back to the low-volatility state in
1993:08 where it remains apart from two periods in 1996-1997.
30Table A1. Standardized LR Statistics for the Change in Consumer Price
LR statistic M =0 M =1 M =2 M =3 M =4
Australia 6.215 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Canada 2.855 (0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.032) (0.025)
Finland 2.877 (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.027) (0.039)
Germany 2.299 (0.058) (0.071) (0.075) (0.070) (0.077)
New Zealand 11.710 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spain 4.932 (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.013)
Sweden 3.822 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.010)
United Kingdom 3.377 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
NOTES: See Hansen (1996) for details of the tests statistic, such as the de￿nition of M.
p-values are in parentheses.
Table A2. Standardized LR Statistics for the Change in Exchange Rate
LR statistic M =0 M =1 M =2 M =3 M =4
Australia 1.800 (0.259) (0.256) (0.248) (0.247) (0.249)
Canada 1.493 (0.406) (0.367) (0.342) (0.358) (0.332)
Finland 8.600 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Germany 1.473 (0.316) (0.315) (0.325) (0.303) (0.307)
New Zealand 3.389 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Spain 4.581 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Sweden 10.213 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
United Kingdom 2.716 (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011)( 0 . 0 10)
NOTES: See Hansen (1996) for details of the tests statistic, such as the de￿nition of M.
p-values are in parentheses.
31Table A3. Estimated Parameters for the Change in Consumer Price
Australia Canada Finland Germany
α0 1.482 (0.269) 1.489 (0.225) 1.438 (0.296) 1.065 (0.297)
α1 7.445 (0.401) 4.632 (0.372) 4.713 (0.503) 3.255 (0.667)
σ0 1.480 (0.200) 1.328 (0.158) 1.636 (0.200) 1.550 (0.207)
σ1 1.949 (0.283) 1.818 (0.260) 2.301 (0.322) 2.984 (0.472)
p 0.942 (0.044) 0.980 (0.024) 0.979 (0.025) 0.933 (0.058)
q 0.953 (0.035) 0.983 (0.019) 0.981 (0.022) 0.971 (0.032)
logL -126.76 -114.60 -127.48 -131.52
Q(1) 0.461 (0.497) 0.745 (0.388) 0.141 (0.707) 0.075 (0.783)
Q(3) 1.072 (0.783) 6.262 (0.099) 6.804 (0.078) 0.669 (0.880)
Q2(1) 2.962 (0.085) 0.102 (0.748) 1.288 (0.256) 0.931 (0.334)
Q2(3) 3.583 (0.310) 3.204 (0.361) 1.549 (0.671) 2.022 (0.567)
NOTES: Standard errors for estimates and P-values for test statistics are in parentheses.
logL is the log-likelihood, Q(k) is the residual Ljung￿Box statistic at lag k, and Q2(k)
is the squared-residual Ljung￿Box statistic at lag k.
Table A4. Dating of Regime 1
Australia Canada Finland Germany
1985:2 1990:4 1985:2 1991:3 1985:2 1992:2 1989:11 995:1
1995:11 995:4
NOTES: Regime 1 is attributed when the probability is above 0.5 and the duration is at least
2p e r i o d s .
32Table A5. Estimated Parameters for the Change in Consumer Price
New Zealand Spain Sweden United Kingdom
α0 1.778 (0.301)2 . 183 (0.333) 1.003 (0.451)2 . 8 4 1 (0.397)
α1 9.496 (1.555) 5.546 (0.403) 5.862 (0.875) 8.027 (1.439)
σ0 1.711 (0.215) 0.947 (0.289) 2.320 (0.318) 2.509 (0.280)
σ1 6.881 (1.067) 2.592 (0.275) 4.754 (0.589) 4.081 (0.839)
p 0.977 (0.030) 0.984 (0.017) 0.980 (0.025) 0.873 (0.106)
q 0.983 (0.019) 0.972 (0.038) 0.978 (0.028) 0.955 (0.033)
logL -151.14- 131.44 -163.68 -154.83
Q(1) 1.785 (0.181) 0.654 (0.418) 0.132 (0.716) 3.849 (0.049)
Q(3) 2.827 (0.419) 4.415 (0.220) 0.614 (0.893) 12.585 (0.005)
Q2(1) 0.038 (0.843) 0.272 (0.601)0 . 126 (0.721) 0.243 (0.621)
Q2(3) 0.277 (0.964) 1.428 (0.698) 0.418 (0.936) 0.807 (0.847)
NOTES: Standard errors for estimates and P-values for test statistics are in parentheses.
logL is the log-likelihood, Q(k) is the residual Ljung￿Box statistic at lag k, and Q2(k)
is the squared-residual Ljung￿Box statistic at lag k.
Table A6. Dating of Regime 1
New Zealand Spain Sweden United Kingdom
1985:2 1990:4 1985:2 1996:4 1985:2 1992:2 1985:2 1985:3
1993:11 994:11 988:4 1991:2
NOTES: Regime 1 is attributed when the probability is above 0.5 and the duration is at least
2p e r i o d s .
33Table A7. Estimated Parameters for the Change in Exchange Rate
Australia Canada Finland Germany
α -0.070 (0.222) -0.105 (0.093) -0.057 (0.051) 0.064 (0.070)
σ0 2.397 (0.255) 0.117( 0 . 147) 0.542 (0.045) 0.887 (0.056)
σ1 5.042 (1.211) 1.403 (0.076) 2.892 (0.351)2 . 184 (0.828)
p 0.376 (0.220) 0.995 (0.017) 0.732 (0.118) 0.362 (0.331)
q 0.851 (0.124) 0.375 (0.738) 0.909 (0.038) 0.964 (0.038)
logL -453.02 -315.66 -258.92 -251.14
Q(1) 2.311 (0.128) 0.567 (0.451) 0.328 (0.566) 0.055 (0.815)
Q(6) 5.819 (0.443) 2.139 (0.906) 3.297 (0.770) 5.114 (0.529)
Q2(1) 1.177 (0.278) 1.269 (0.260) 0.114 (0.735) 0.489 (0.484)
Q2(6) 4.499 (0.609) 6.363 (0.383) 0.222 (0.999) 1.594 (0.953)
NOTES: Standard errors for estimates and P-values for test statistics are in parentheses.
logL is the log-likelihood, Q(k) is the residual Ljung￿Box statistic at lag k, and Q2(k)
is the squared-residual Ljung￿Box statistic at lag k.
Table A8. Dating of Regime 1
Australia Canada Finland Germany
1985:03 1985:04 1985:03 2000:02 1989:04 1989:05 1992:10 1992:11
1986:07 1986:08 1992:10 1992:11






NOTES: Regime 1 is attributed when the probability is above 0.5 and the duration is at least
2p e r i o d s .
34Table A9. Estimated Parameters for the Change in Exchange Rate
New Zealand Spain Sweden United Kingdom
α -0.148 (0.164) -0.053 (0.070) -0.040 (0.055) 0.065 (0.140)
σ0 1.922 (0.132) 0.822 (0.063) 0.554 (0.040) 1.466 (0.172)
σ1 4.324 (0.495) 2.964 (0.557) 2.517( 0 . 199) 3.335 (0.540)
p 0.987 (0.018) 0.756 (0.156) 0.983 (0.013) 0.914 (0.065)
q 0.994 (0.006) 0.967 (0.025) 0.992 (0.008) 0.968 (0.027)
logL -415.92 -265.50 -282.33 -374.18
Q(1) 0.181 (0.670) 1.716( 0 . 190) 2.978 (0.084) 0.400 (0.526)
Q(6) 6.850 (0.334) 6.812 (0.338) 6.261 (0.394) 3.784 (0.705)
Q2(1) 3.217 (0.072) 0.674 (0.411) 0.007 (0.929) 0.327 (0.567)
Q2(6) 3.988 (0.407) 1.072 (0.982) 0.049 (0.998) 0.663 (0.995)
NOTES: Standard errors for estimates and P-values for test statistics are in parentheses.
logL is the log-likelihood, Q(k) is the residual Ljung￿Box statistic at lag k, and Q2(k)
is the squared-residual Ljung￿Box statistic at lag k.
Table A10. Dating of Regime 1
New Zealand Spain Sweden United Kingdom
1985:08 1989:12 1989:06 1989:07 1992:12 1999:10 1985:04 1985:10
1992:10 1992:12 1986:011 987:05
1993:05 1994:03 1992:10 1993:07
1996:11 1997:03
1997:07 1997:12
NOTES: Regime 1 is attributed when the probability is above 0.5 and the duration is at least
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Figure 4: Log changes in trade weighted exchange rate (multiplied by 100)
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